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FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
This study follows three previous reports on the Palestinian living conditions 
in the Occupied and Autonomous Territories and the impact of the 
international and local aid during the second Intifada. The three reports were 
released in March, August and December 2001, and they respectively 
covered the period from 1st October 2000 to 31st January 2001, from 1st 
February to mid-June 2001 and from mid-June to 31st October 2001 (see in 
the references: Bocco, Brunner and Rabah 2001a, and 2001b; Bocco, 
Brunner, Daneels and Rabah 2001).  
 
During the months of January and February 2002, the team was beginning to 
prepare a 4th report, whose scope was broader than the previous ones in 
terms of questions and period of time surveyed, as well as International 
Agencies involved in the funding of the new study. A new poll was planned 
for early May. However, due to the evolution of the crisis in the Autonomous 
and Occupied Palestinian Territories in March and especially April, the team 
put the new project on hold.  
 
By early April, The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) 
and the Swiss Humanitarian Aid contracted the IUED (Graduate Institute of 
Development Studies of the University of Geneva) to conduct an 
“emergency” poll in the West Bank. The survey was intended to provide 
stakeholders with an overview of the perceptions of the Palestinian urban, 
rural and refugee population on the effects of the Israeli army operations in 
the West Bank, and how these have been affecting the Palestinians’ living 
conditions.  
 
The IUED assigned a small team of experts composed of Dr. Riccardo Bocco 
(professor of political sociology and deputy director at IUED) as team leader, 
Mr. Matthias Brunner (lecturer in political science methodology at the 
Department of Political Science of the University of Geneva, and director of 
CyberProjects), Dr. Isabelle Daneels (political scientist and independent 
researcher), and Mr Jamil Rabah (poll specialist and consultant for the SDC 
Office Gaza and West Bank ).  
 
The poll’s questionnaire (see Annex 1 for the English version) was drafted by 
the above-mentioned experts’ team and reviewed by a number of 
stakeholders who individually pointed out variables pertinent to drawing an 
objective assessment of the needs and conditions of the Palestinian 
population in the West Bank. We are particularly grateful to Mrs Katy Attfield 
(Assistance Coordinator, ICRC, Jerusalem), Mr Bertrand Bainvel 
(Programme Officer, UNICEF, Jerusalem), Mr Guy Siri (Deputy Director of 
UNRWA Operations & Field Technical Officer, West Bank Field Office, 
Jerusalem), Mrs Zeina Mogarbel Valles (Programme Officer, European 
Commission, Jerusalem), Dr. Hussam Sharqawi (Emergency Response 
Coordinator, Palestine Red Crescent Society, Ramallah), Dr. Elia Zureik 
(Professor of Sociology at Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada), Pierre-
Yves Fux (Political Division IV, Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bern).  
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The IUED subcontracted the JMCC (Jerusalem Media and Communication 
Centre) for conducting the poll. The survey was conducted by phone between 
April 15th and 23rd under the supervision of Mr Ghassan Khatib, director of 
the JMCC. This study could not have been conducted without the 
cooperation of the Palestinian Telecommunications Company (PALTEL) and 
the Palestinian Mobile Phone Company (JAWWAL). We are particularly 
grateful to Mr Walid Najjab, Mr Hakam Kanafani and Mr Ahmad Ouweida for 
their most appreciated efforts to select and facilitate the supply of random 
phone numbers. While their companies were targeted by the Israeli army 
operations and their services were disrupted, they worked relentlessly and 
voluntarily around the clock to salvage what had become an almost 
impossible task.  
 
Special thanks are also due to the group of JMCC fieldworkers who turned 
“phoneworkers” for this somewhat special survey, as under the prevailing 
circumstances it was not possible to conduct a survey except by phone. Their 
commitment has also been rewarded by the population surveyed, who 
generally showed a great enthusiasm and cooperation in answering the 
questions.  
 
Finally, we are particularly thankful to Mr. Daniel Meier (research assistant at 
IUED), who participated in the collection of secondary sources of information 
and was able to provide quickly the needed summary of the information 
available on the internet.  
 
The experts’ work was conducted between Geneva, Jerusalem and Ramallah 
under difficult circumstances. The secondary sources of information utilized 
in this report mainly cover the period between early March and late April 
2002. The authors of the report do not pretend to have included all the 
available sources of information: the time constraints and the practical 
problems resulting from the still ongoing military operations have limited the 
access to wider data under production by local and international 
stakeholders.  
 
The data were collected and entered by the JMCC, while the data cleaning, 
weighting and interpretation are the sole responsibility of the authors of this 
report.  
 
 
 
Geneva, 30th April 2002 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
During the past two months, the violence of the latest Palestinian-Israeli 
confrontations has reached unprecedented peaks. Though it is still too early 
to present a detailed and comprehensive assessment1 of the impact of the 
Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) operations in the Occupied and Autonomous 
Palestinian Territories (OAPT), this report aims at presenting the reactions 
and needs expressed by the population sample chosen for our poll2 in the 
week that the military operations in the West Bank became less intense. 
While the main results of the survey are presented in the following chapters, 
this introduction has three main objectives. Firstly, we will recall the main 
events between the beginning of March and late April; secondly, we will offer 
a synthesis of the information made available by a number of experts and 
humanitarian organizations during or in the immediate aftermath of the Israeli 
army’s operations; thirdly, we will briefly sketch some main trends affecting 
Israeli and Palestinian societies, in a situation characterized by a local and 
international political stalemate.  
 
 
The Downward Spiral of Violence 
On March 5th  2002, the Israeli Prime Minister declared that: “It won’t be 
possible to reach an agreement with the Palestinians before the Palestinians 
are hit hard. Now they have to be hit. If they aren’t badly beaten, there won’t 
be any negotiations. Only after they are beaten we will we be able to conduct 
talks”3.  
 
This declaration came in a context marked by an increase in violence and 
counter-violence which intensified after almost three years of relative 
calmness (see figure 1 below) and the escalation of Israeli measures against 
the Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority in the wake of a surge in 
Palestinian resilience against the occupation, and the subsequent increase in 
the suicide attacks against Israelis.  
 
 
                                                     
1 It is also important to mention that the Palestinian institutions, like the Palestinian Central 
Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), who usually gather and analyze data in the OAPT have been 
unable to operate under the siege conditions imposed by the Israeli army during the months 
of March and April. Actually, the PCBS’ offices have already been victim of an IDF incursion 
during the month of December and an important part of their equipment destroyed.  
2 The focus of this report on the West Bank does not implicitly mean that during the period of 
March and April 2002 the situation in the Gaza Strip has turned “calm”. The analysis of the 
situation there will be the object of a study in the near future.  
3 See the daily newspaper Ha’aretz, 5 March 2002.  
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Figure 1 Deaths among Palestinians and Israelis 
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Total number of Israeli soldiers and civilians killed by attacks from 
Palestinians between 1993 and 2002 is 356 (source 
http://ww.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MEFAHi5dO). Five  times as many 
Palestinians were killed in less than 18 months alone.
On the 32nd anniversary of the establishment of the Jewish presence 
in Hebron, Barak sends a congratulatiory message to the settlers in 
Hebron, expressing his support for their presence in the city. (April 2, 
2000). Moreover, Barak wanted to ask the Knesset for 1.2 billion for 
settlements.
The first attack by Al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade was in Nov 29, 2001. Even 
then, Hamas also claimed responsibility for that attack.
53% of all of those Israelis killed since 1993 happened during  
Sharon's tenure.
 Data is not available on the 
numerous Palestinians that were 
also killed between 1993 and 1999
 
 
 
In the days preceding Mr. Ariel Sharon statement, the IDF had actually began 
a sustained three-week campaign. Several refugee camps in the West Bank 
have been the main targets of the “Colorful Journey Operation”. By the end of 
March, while the IDF had already declared having met its objectives and put 
a halt to its offensive, the Israeli Prime Minister responded negatively to a 
Saudi proposal – adopted by the Arab Summit in Beirut - for a 
comprehensive resolution of the Palestinian/Arab-Israeli conflict based on 
international law4. After a suicide-bomber’s attack5 in Netanya on March 27th, 
Mr. Ariel Sharon declared that Palestinian President Yasser Arafat was an 
enemy of Israel and that Israel was in a state of war.  
 
Starting from March 29th the Israeli army launched a new campaign – 
“Operation Defensive Shields” – aiming at the continuation of the “terrorist 
infrastructure’s eradication” in the OAPT. On the same day, the IDF tanks re-
occupied Ramallah and began setting a very severe siege around the 
Palestinian Authority President’s headquarters6. On March 31st, following 
another suicide-bomber’s attack in a Haifa restaurant7, Ramallah was 
officially declared “closed military zone”.  
 
                                                     
4 On the Israeli government’s refusal of the Saudi peace plan, BADIL (2002d) quotes former 
Israeli Prime minister Ehud Barak who told CNN that « it is not enough for the Arab States to 
recognize Israel. They must recognize it as a Jewish State. Israel is not a normal democracy 
in the Middle East. It is a State for the Jewish people ».  
5 With 28 people killed and officially perpetrated by Hamas activists, the Netanya attack 
scored the heaviest death toll since the beginning of the second Intifada.  
6 The UN Security Council resolution 1402 of March 30th asking the IDF to pull back was not 
implemented.  
7 In the attack, 16 people  were killed.  
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On April 1st, Tulkarem and Qalqiliya were reoccupied, on April 2nd the IDF 
entered Bethlehem and the headquarters of the Palestinian Preventive 
Security in Ramallah were seized. On the same day, Mr. Arafat rejected Mr. 
Sharon’s proposal of leaving definitively Palestine for a foreign country. The 
Israeli army entered Nablus on April 3rd, around 50 tanks arrived in Jenin and 
around 200 people took refuge in the Bethlehem Church of Nativity. Starting 
from April 6th, the IDF launched a massive attack on Jenin refugee camp, 
lasting almost two weeks. The Israeli military forces pulled back from 
Qalqilyia and Tulkarem on April 9th; the day after 8 Israelis were killed in 
another suicide-bombing attack near Haifa. On April 11th the IDF declared 
having imprisoned more than 4000 Palestinians since the beginning of the 
operation “Defensive Shields”.  
 
The US Secretary of State, Mr. Colin Powell, arrived in Jerusalem on April 
12th. While the IDF was continuing its operations in the Jenin refugee camp 
and several Palestinian organizations were denouncing a “massacre”, a 
suicide-bomber’s attack in West Jerusalem killed 7 people. Mr. Arafat 
condemned “the terrorist actions against the civilian populations, be they 
Israelis or Palestinians”. On April 14th Mr. Powell met separately with the 
President of the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Prime Minister: the latter 
suggested that the “terrorists” retrenched in the Church of Nativity in 
Bethlehem should be judged in Israel or banned to exile in a third host 
country.  
 
On April 15th a first group of ICRC representatives was allowed in the Jenin 
refugee camp, while Marwan Barghouti, leader of Fateh in the West Bank 
and a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council was captured. The IDF  
pulled back from Jenin refugee camp on April 19th, and the UN Security 
Council adopted resolution 1405 providing for the establishment of a “fact-
finding commission” on the events in Jenin. The Israeli military commander-
in-chief declared the end of the first phase of the “Defensive Shields 
Operation”: the Israeli troops pulled back from Nablus and larger parts of 
Ramallah, but the siege around Yasser Arafat’s Headquarters was not lifted8.  
 
 
Towards a humanitarian catastrophe? 
The Israeli military offensive in the West Bank has certainly been 
unprecedented in its severity. Reports from international and local 
humanitarian organizations show that a vast majority of the Palestinian 
population has been harmed by Israel’s military campaign. The widespread 
civilian suffering includes lack of physical safety, deaths and injuries, food 
and water shortages, lack of access to emergency and regular medical care, 
damage to and destruction of homes and private property, as well as damage 
                                                     
8 In most cases, the retreat of the Israeli army has basically meant the lifting of the curfew 
and the possibility for the urban population to circulate again in the towns that had been re-
occupied, but the mobility of the civilians remains severely curtailed outside most cities and 
villages, often still encircled by Israeli tanks. Following an attack by armed Palestinians in the 
Jewish settlement of Adora and the killing of four settlers on April 27th, two days later the IDF 
has re-occupied Hebron.  
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to and destruction of civilian infrastructure (electricity, sewage, roads, public 
institutions’ buildings, etc…). Unemployment is at soaring heights and the 
number of people living below the poverty line has dramatically increased. 
Refugees, women and children have been particularly vulnerable to the IDF’s 
operations (BADIL 2002a). In the space of a few weeks, the progress made 
over the years of the “Oslo Peace Process” in developing viable, independent 
institutions, along with any symbol of Palestinian autonomy, have been 
annihilated.  
 
According to the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS), from the beginning 
of the Intifada up to April 30th 2002, the total number of deaths and injuries in 
the OAPT is of 1,521 and 19,141 respectively9 (see figure 2 and 
http://www.Palestinercs.org). Although the number of deaths could still be 
higher for the month of April in particular, the graphic below clearly shows 
that the last two months have scored the heaviest death toll since the 
beginning of the uprising. During the month of March, 234 Palestinians have 
been killed and 870 were injured (480 of whom by live ammunition); in April 
the people killed number 245 and the injured 523.  
 
 
Figure 2 Monthly deaths and injuries, Sept. 29 2000 – Apr. 30 2002   
 
 
 
During the IDF’s campaign, many local and international humanitarian and 
human rights organizations have denounced several forms of violation of 
international humanitarian law. These include attacks on medic and 
paramedic personnel, ambulances, preventing mobility in emergency 
situations for health care, as well as obstructing access to hospitals in a 
                                                     
9 In a recent report on the IDF’s open-fire regulations during the al-Aqsa Intifada, B’tselem 
(the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) has stressed 
that: “The IDF’s policy (…) has resulted in extensive harm to Palestinian civilians who were 
not involved in any activity against Israel. These incidents are not “exceptional” cases, but 
rather they constitute a large portion of the casualties throughout the Occupied Territories” 
(B’tselem 2002a).  
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number of cases. Organizations such as the ICRC, the PRCS, and Amnesty 
international, have been documenting this kind of violations and are 
beginning to offer evidence in reports available on the websites of the 
respective organizations. In a study published in early March, B’tselem 
(2002b) had already denounced the practices of the IDF’s soldiers in the 
OAPT in impeding access to medical treatment and firing at ambulances. The 
practices reported by the Israeli human rights organization seem to have 
worsened during the Defensive Shields Operation.  
 
On its side, UNRWA has stressed that curfews and closures have kept large 
numbers of the UN Agency’s workforce from their work10. With IDF troops still 
occupying Bethlehem and a curfew in force, UNRWA’s health centre in the 
town remains closed. In the adjacent Aida camp, UNRWA has retained a 
doctor on a 24-hour basis to treat refugees who cannot reach the health 
centre. Health centres in the Dheisheh, Balata, Askar and No.1 refugee 
camps operated around the clock as long as IDF soldiers were present 
(UNRWA 2002a).  
 
Many organizations have so far denounced damages and destruction of 
private and public immovable property. To date, the only available report 
concerning the physical destruction of public buildings is the one related to 
the Palestinian governmental institutions in Ramallah11. The report shows 
that there is a very consistent pattern of systematic invasion, destruction and 
vandalism in all of the public buildings surveyed. In the majority of the cases 
covered, the Ministries were invaded long after any fighting was taking place 
in Ramallah and destruction was purely deliberate and not an outcome of 
military clashes. In about a third of the ministries invaded, confiscation of 
documents was undertaken, while in others the damage was pure physical 
destruction of equipment plus general vandalism (Hammami, Hanafi and 
Taylor 2002).  
 
UNRWA is preparing a comprehensive damage assessment, but it has 
already put forward that in Jenin approximately 30% of the refugee camp has 
been destroyed during the offensive. An estimated 160 buildings, many of 
them two and three stories high were reduced to rubble. Around 100 others 
were so severely damaged that they are now structurally unsound and 
consequently no longer habitable (UNRWA 2002a).12 
 
                                                     
10 Over 60% of the staff members residing in the West Bank but assigned to positions in the 
Agency Field Office in Jerusalem have been unable to report to work since the offensive 
began. Staff members with homes in Hebron have likewise been unable to reach their 
workplaces in Bethlehem and vice versa. The Agency’s Area Office in Ramallah went 
unmanned for almost a month, from March 29th to April 22nd (UNRWA 2002a).  
11 The report prepared by Hammami, Hanafi and Taylor (updated to 22nd March 2002) 
documents the damage inflicted on PA civil institutions in Ramallah during the Israeli 
invasion and re-occupation of Palestinian population centres by the IDF, from March 29th  to 
April 21st . The majority of the cases covered are ministries. The report covers 11 of them in 
detail; another four have been similarly affected but the data have not yet been collected on 
them. It seems that only two Ramallah-based ministries did not suffer IDF incursions: the 
Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Youth and Sports.  
12 UNRWA estimates that 800 families have been made homeless.  
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The re-occupation of large areas of the West Bank has also turned back the 
clock on educational development. With almost half of the Palestinian 
population under the age of 15, education is a cornerstone of Palestinian 
society. Almost a million children – actually, one third of the Palestinian 
population residing in the Autonomous and Occupied Territories – are 
enrolled in the school system. As Penny Johnson (2002) has pointed out, the 
Israeli army invasion of Palestinian cities, villages and refugee camps, has 
damaged educational infrastructure, records and equipments, threatened the 
institutions and the very system’s financial solvency, and harmed teachers 
and pupils. The education budget has constituted so far almost 20% of the 
Palestinian Authority regular budget. Already before the invasion, the PA was 
hardly managing to continue paying teachers and maintaining schools under 
an austerity budget. In the present circumstances this ability is gravely 
threatened.  
 
Overall, the IDF attack on education and educational institutions, as well as 
other Palestinian institutions of self-government and non-governmental 
organizations, indicates that the Israeli army’s target has actually been the 
Palestinian infrastructure, organizational capacity and self-government, with 
lasting consequences on the ability of Palestinian society to survive and 
develop (Johnson 2002). Finally, as Pierre Poupard has stressed: “UNICEF 
is convinced that if the current generation in Palestine is not given the chance 
to grow under normal circumstances, there would be little hope for stability in 
the region” (Abu Halaweh 2002).  
 
 
The Palestinian and Israeli war-torn societies 
In a recently published article (Hazony 2002), the President of the Mina 
Zemach/Shalem Centre has presented the results of a poll conducted during 
the week of 14th-20th April among a representative sample of Israeli Jews. 
The survey shows that most of the population is solidly united in the view that 
Arafat will not fight terror seriously (82%), that he is not interested in real 
peace with Israel (87%), that he cannot be trusted to keep agreements (90%) 
and cannot be believed when he condemns terror (98%). Most believe that 
Israel should not conduct substantive negotiations with Arafat (74%).  
 
For a great majority of Israeli Jews, these “hard-won lessons” learnt during 
the last 19 months of Intifada, have meant support for Mr. Sharon’s 
government, whose last operation “Defensive Shields” has been assessed as 
the “right policy” by 88% of the people interviewed. An overwhelming 83% 
support his unity government or would prefer a narrow Likud government, as 
against 8% who wish to see a narrow Labor government. Moreover, 76% 
consider Sharon “well suited” to his job. Opponents of the government’s 
policies are essentially without a constituency. Shlomo Ben Ami is thought 
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well suited to lead the country by 11% of the respondents, while Yossi Beilin 
by a mere 7%13.  
 
Although the death and injuries toll on the Palestinian side has been so far 
heavier and the living conditions in the OAPT have become close to survival 
strategies for a majority of the population, the Israeli society at large is deeply 
frightened by the suicide-bombers’ attacks. Most Israelis and Palestinians 
today know directly or indirectly of someone killed or maimed in the attacks 
and counter-attacks that have taken place since the beginning of the second 
Intifada, and particularly intensified during the last months. The security 
conditions for both Palestinians and Israelis do not seem to be guaranteed for 
anybody. The daily potential threat and fear of suicide-bombing echoes the 
daily menace of military operations on a massive scale in the OAPT or the 
continuation of the “extra-judicial killing policy” implemented by the Israeli 
government against “Palestinian terrorists”.  
 
Unable to work, to go to school, and seek medical care or buy food, 
thousands of Palestinians have been prisoners around the clock in their own 
homes for extended periods of time. As Mustapha Barghouti has put it: “this 
is yet another example of collective punishment practiced by Sharon and the 
Israeli government. Furthermore, Sharon is using this as a weapon, an 
instrument of political aggression to put pressure on the Palestinian Authority 
and the Palestinian people” (Palestine Monitor 2002). Besides their dire living 
conditions outlined in the following chapters of this study, a majority of 
Palestinians is presently feeling humiliated, isolated, their resentment and 
anger probably mounting. Whether the Operation “Defensive Shields” will 
bear some fruits in terms of bringing the two sides to the table of negotiations 
is doubtful, and it seems even less sure that the security of the Israeli civilian 
population at large has been increased by the military invasions.  
 
While the logic of force and military confrontation has been having the upper 
hand until now, most local and international observers agree on the danger 
that has characterized the crisis during the past seven months in particular, 
i.e. the absence of a political/diplomatic process14. In this context, the 
                                                     
13 Concerning the attitude towards the USA, a majority of the people interviewed (79%) 
believe that the super-power is a “true friend”, but 89% call America’s demand that Israel 
halts its anti-terror campaign in the West Bank “unfair” (Hazony 2002).  
14 In another poll conducted in Israel by the Ma’ariv newspaper on Friday, the 10th of April, 
Israelis were asked which of the following peace proposals they either support or oppose. 
The top choice (with 57% in favour and 35% against) was a unilateral separation plan that 
includes a withdrawal from 80% of the Occupied Territories, the erection of a fence, the 
dismantling of the settlements, and the annexation of 80% of the settlers. The second choice 
(with 54% in favour and 40% against) was the establishment of a Palestinian State. Placing a 
close third was acceptance of the Saudi initiative, which means transferring all the territories 
in exchange for a comprehensive peace: 52% support this option, while 42% oppose it. The 
Israeli public was evenly split (47% in favour, 48% against) on the option of stationing 
international forces and an international mandate to supervise a Palestinian State. The least 
attractive choice to Israelis was a proposal to annex all the Occupied Territories and 
implement a “transfer”, with 32% in favour and 60% against. (see Ma’ariv, April 12th 2002, 
and Harman 2002). These results may also be interpreted as a sign of “hope” since, on 
certain issues, they seem to show a softer attitude of the Israeli public compared to that of 
their Prime Minister.  
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humanitarian organizations are clearly becoming a hostage of the political 
stalemate15. 
                                                     
15 In a recent report, BADIL (2002b) has stressed that: “The damage inflicted by the Israeli 
military since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada also means that the international 
community has to allocate financial resources to pay for the same projects several times due 
to repeated damage and destruction. Since the beginning of the Intifada, for example, the al-
Nour Rehabilitation Centre for the Visually Impaired in the Gaza Strip has been damaged 
and repaired more than five times. In the case of the US, in particular, one of the largest 
donors to UNRWA’s regular budget and emergency appeals, the American government is, at 
the same time, providing financial resources to UNRWA and providing Israel with the 
weapons that destroy the projects paid for, in part, by US funds”.  
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METHODOLOGY 
 
 
A survey to estimate and evaluate the conditions of the Palestinian 
population during the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) operations and the re-
occupation of large parts of the West Bank has been conducted by the JMCC 
from its Jerusalem offices. Because of the curfews and closures, and hence 
the impossibility to carry out a regular household survey as we usually did in 
our previous studies, we opted for a telephone poll.  
 
The Palestinian Telecommunications Company (PALTEL) and the 
Palestinian Mobile Phone Company (JAWWAL) provided 6000 randomly 
selected telephone numbers from all of the districts of the West Bank, 
excluding Jericho. While the penetration rate of telephones in Palestinian 
households is not comprehensive, it is safe to argue that over 50% of 
Palestinian households have fixed telephone lines and many of those who do 
not, have mobile phones (there are almost 380,000 mobile phones). The 
telephone list was also used in this survey. 
 
It must be noted that the sample of the present study differs in many aspects 
from the samples of our three previous reports (see the methodology section 
in: Bocco, Brunner, Rabah 2001a and 2001b; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, 
Rabah 2001). While it can be shown that the three previous polls were based 
on strong statistical evidence, the present one cannot offer the same level of 
confidence. Usually, a phone poll based on fixed telephone lines in a country 
where the coverage exceeds 95% requires corrections of the sample. Here, 
we rely on mobile phones which have a much lower coverage in a region that 
is at war or under curfew.  
 
However, in checking how the sample could be representative, we have 
asked a question about the household size in order to compare it with the 
national averages. The results point to a very strong correlation between the 
distribution of the household size and that of the national figures.  
 
Our respondents are owners of mobile phones; this population is usually a bit 
better off than the average Palestinian. Furthermore, they were able to 
answer: this means that they were not under arrest, seriously wounded nor 
dead. Actually, our sample is certainly biased but towards minimizing the 
hardship of the regions that were re-occupied by the IDF.  
 
The very nature of this context and its emergency were reasons for us not to 
try to correct the sample this time. The reader should keep in mind that our 
results are certainly less accurate in the present report but that they tend to 
underestimate the severity of the present crisis. 
 
The survey was conducted between Monday 15th and Tuesday 23rd April. A 
draft report prepared for the international donors’ meeting held in Oslo on 
April 24-25 was based on 1078 interviews. The main information for this final 
report is based on 1524 completed questionnaires, the analysis of which was 
completed by April 29th, 2002.  
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As shown in figure 3 below, the completed interviews were distributed 
according to the following areas: 
 
 
Figure 3 Interviews by region and area of residence 
 
Hebron
16%
Bethlehem
17%
Ramallah
17%
Nablus
17%
Jenin
16%
Tulkarem
17%
City
71%
Village
25%
Refugee camp
5%
 
 
 
For providing an overview of the current situation, the report has been divided 
into five main sections: 
 
 Living conditions  
 Household needs and shortages 
 Damages 
 Access to health  
 Impact on children  
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PART 1. LIVING CONDITIONS 
 
 
When respondents were asked to describe their current living conditions in 
comparison to before the recent Israeli military operations, only 3% of the 
sample replied that their living conditions had remained the same. All the 
remaining respondents described their living conditions as being worse than 
before the Israeli re-occupation, albeit in different degrees. As shown in figure 
4, below, an impressive 56% described their living conditions as being 
destitute, more than 30% depicted their situation as difficult, while a 
mere 10% considered it manageable. 
 
 
Figure 4  Perception of living conditions  
Perception of living conditions in the aftermath of the 
Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank
Same
3.1%
Worse but manageable
10.1%
Worse and difficult
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The feeling of hardship is spread all over the West Bank regions. As can be 
discerned from table 1, below, the perception of worsening living conditions is 
common in all parts of the West Bank. However, in Hebron, where the Israeli 
military operation was less extensive than in some other West Bank areas, 
only one third of the respondents described their living conditions as being 
destitute, and far more respondents in Hebron than in other locations stated 
that their living conditions remained the same (8%) or were manageable 
(more than 16%). 
 
While in the Tulkarem and Qalqilya districts one finds the highest percentage 
of the population who perceives their living conditions as destitute (almost 
70%), it is in the Bethlehem district that the population cumulates the highest 
percentage (95% !) of difficult and destitute living conditions. This can be 
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partly explained by the fact that the town of Bethlehem has experienced so 
far the longest period of curfew.  
 
 
Table 1  Living conditions compared to before the reoccupation  
 
 Living conditions in comparison to before the reoccupation 
  Same Worse but 
manageable 
Worse - difficult Worse - destitute
Hebron 21 41 100 89 
  8.4% 16.3% 39.8% 35.5% 
Bethlehem 4 10 81 156 
  1.6% 4.0% 32.3% 62.2% 
Ramallah 11 26 79 148 
  4.2% 9.8% 29.9% 56.1% 
Nablus 1 31 85 134 
  .4% 12.4% 33.9% 53.4% 
Jenin 7 16 84 143 
  2.8% 6.4% 33.6% 57.2% 
Tulkarem & Qalqilia 3 30 43 176 
  1.2% 11.9% 17.1% 69.8% 
 Total 47 154 472 846 
  3.1% 10.1% 31.1% 55.7% 
 
 
In terms of cumulative percentage of Palestinians living in difficult conditions, 
Jenin comes second, after Bethlehem. This can certainly be put in relation to 
the IDF attacks, but their impact has probably been harder because the 
people living in the town of Jenin and the adjacent refugee camp, were 
already considered among the poorest of the West Bank’s eight main 
districts. According to the recent report of R. Giacaman and P. Johnson 
(2002), almost half of the inhabitants of the city of Jenin are registered 
refugees with UNRWA; two thirds of the camp dwellers are women, children 
and elderly people; and more than 40% are under the age of 15. According to 
the 1997 national census, about 70% of Jenin refugee camp males aged 15 
and over were economically active in the formal labor force and another 20% 
were students. Most camp residents worked in the agricultural sector, almost 
a third of the camp labor force were unskilled workers, and many used to be 
employed inside Israel.  
 
Since the beginning of the second Intifada, the tightening of Israeli 
restrictions on movement, and the limitations on effective interchange 
between the towns and its neighboring villages has led to serious economic 
strife. The inability of laborers to travel freely has led to very high levels of 
unemployment and a severe drop in family income. Using the data from the 
Institute of Women Studies’ survey of 1999, Giacaman and Johnson (2002) 
have stressed that the home economy in Jenin refugee camp seemed to be 
an important means to sustain families, and indicative of under-development, 
deprivation and poverty16.  
                                                     
16 According to the same authors, 47% of Jenin camp residents were poor, while only 23% in 
Jenin city fell in this category. Only 36% of the Jenin households had a phone line and 14% 
a private car. More than 33% of the women over 12 and living in the refugee camp were 
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Returning to the more general situation in the West Bank, when asked for 
how long the households could cope with the money they currently have, one 
quarter of the respondents replied that they ran out of money, while one third 
declared that they could only cope for a few more days. As illustrated in table 
2, below, only 9% of the respondents stated that they could cope for a long 
time with the money they have. More than 30% said that they would be able 
to cope for a few weeks. 
 
Table 2  Duration of coping with money 
 
  Frequency Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
For a long time 128 8.9 8.9 
Only for few weeks 447 31.1 40.0 
Only for few days 471 32.8 72.8 
Ran out of money 371 25.8 98.6 
No use for money while we are under curfew 17 1.2 99.8 
No need for money because we can't go and buy anything 2 .1 99.9 
Forced to manage with or without money 1 .1 100.0 
Total 1437 100.0  
 
Although it is clear that the majority of Palestinians are currently in dire 
financial difficulties, it seems that Palestinians living in refugee camps are 
enduring even harsher financial conditions. As can be observed in figure 
5, below, almost half of the interviewed refugee camp residents said that they 
already ran out of money compared to 23% of city dwellers and 30% of 
villagers.  
 
Figure 5  Duration of coping by area 
Period of time to cope financially 
according to area
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illiterate, compared to 21% of males; slightly more than 20% of the entire camp population 
had achieved secondary education.  
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According to the assessment made by BADIL (2002e) at the end of March, 
“unemployment levels have likely risen even higher than the rates in the 
previous three-month period. As of November 2001, unemployment in West 
Bank refugee camps stood at 37%, with the rate in the Gaza Strip at 50%. 
According to the World Bank, unemployment levels (including persons who 
have given up hope for finding an employment and are no longer searching 
for work) reached 35% at the end of 2001, up from more than 20% in 
September 2000. Emergency temporary job creation programs are 
simply not able to cope with the massive increase in unemployment 
and became defunct during Israeli military raids in the refugee camps”.  
 
At the end of April 2002, the total proportion of Palestinian refugees living 
below the poverty line (US$ 2,00 per person per day, according to the World 
Bank indicators) is also likely to be even higher than in the past three months. 
Actually, “the attacks on refugee camps (…) caused widespread damage, 
injuries and deaths in the refugee community, and have reduced even further 
what little material capital and savings refugees have to rely on during 
periods of economic instability and political crisis, while the large number of 
deaths and injuries leads to reduced and/or loss of household income. 
Widespread looting by Israeli soldiers (…) has further exacerbated the 
economic hardship experienced by refugees” (BADIL 2002e).  
 
The impact of the recent Israeli military attacks on the camps, will likely result 
as well as in an increased number of refugee families seeking special 
hardship assistance from UNRWA. According to our previous report (Bocco, 
Brunner, Daneels, Rabah 2001), as well as other later sources (World Bank 
2002), already by November 2001, the poverty rate among the Palestinian 
refugees was around 45% in the West Bank and 65% in the Gaza Strip. As 
of late April 2002, it is likely that two thirds of the refugee population, 
those residing in camps in particular, is living below the poverty line, 
despite considerable emergency employment, food and cash assistance by 
the UN and other international donors.  
 
Basic living conditions and standards have also been affected by disruptions 
in the water and electricity supplies. As illustrated in figure 6, below, only 
38% of the respondents had no disruptions in their water supply and only 
31% had no disruptions in their electricity supply. The results of the survey 
indicate that most of these disruptions seemed to have been temporary in 
nature. Indeed, while 13% of the interviewees said that they were still without 
water at the time of the interview, only 5% declared that they still did not have 
electricity. The visits conducted by the authors of this report to some of the 
cities and districts of the West Bank allow them to say that in many cases the 
water and electricity networks have been fixed rather quickly. However, this 
does not allow for assessing the damages, or for estimating the durability of 
the reparations.  
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Figure 6  Water and electricity supply 
37.7%
42.
13.4%
4.6%
1.3%
0.5%
0.3%
No disruptions
Disruption for few days
Still no water
Comes and goes
We use own private wells
Water is very scarce
We buy water
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Water conditions during the Israeli 
reoccupation of the West Bank
n=1521
 
30.8%
50.8%
4.6%
13.6%
0.3%
 No disruptions
 Disruption for few days
 Still no electricity
 Comes and goes
 We have a generator
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60
Electricity conditions during the Israeli
reoccupation of the West Bank
n=1524
 
 
 
Table 3  Clean water conditions by area 
 
  City Village RC Total 
No disruptions 359 194 21 574 
  33.5% 51.5% 29.6% 37.7% 
Disruption for few days 498 108 35 641 
  46.4% 28.6% 49.3% 42.1% 
Still no water 146 52 6 204 
  13.6% 13.8% 8.5% 13.4% 
Comes and goes 53 10 7 70 
  4.9% 2.7% 9.9% 4.6% 
We use own private wells 6 12 2 20 
  .6% 3.2% 2.8% 1.3% 
Water is very scarce 7 1  8 
  .7% .3%  .5% 
We buy water 4   4 
  .4%   .3% 
 TOTAL 1073 377 71 1521 
  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 4  Electricity conditions by area 
 
  City Village RC Total 
No disruptions 255 198 16 469 
  23.7% 52.4% 22.5% 30.8% 
Disruption for few days 611 130 33 774 
  56.8% 34.4% 46.5% 50.8% 
Still no electricity 53 13 4 70 
  4.9% 3.4% 5.6% 4.6% 
Comes and goes 156 34 17 207 
  14.5% 9.0% 23.9% 13.6% 
We have a generator  3 1 4 
   .8% 1.4% .3% 
 Total 1075 378 71 1524 
  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Tables 3 & 4 show that water and electricity conditions vary a lot by area of 
residence. In refugee camps and cities, only a third of our respondents had 
no water disruptions and a quarter had continuous electricity while these 
proportions were close to 50% of village dwellers. In cities and villages 
though, 14% of the respondents still had no water when they were 
interviewed and 5% no electricity.    
 
Electricity and water conditions also differ significantly from one region to the 
other: tables 5 & 6 clearly illustrate this point: 
 
 Clean water supply was particularly affected in Nablus and Jenin. While 
38% of the overall respondents had no disruption, only 19% in Nablus and 
25% in Jenin were in the same situation.  
 
 In Jenin, 31% of respondents still have no water; In Hebron 25% have the 
same problem, while less than 10% are affected elsewhere.  
 
 Nablus, Jenin and to a lesser extent Ramallah seem to have suffered 
more than other regions concerning their electricity supply. In other 
regions, at least 34% of the population suffered no disruptions while in 
these regions the proportions are respectively 21%, 21% and 25%. 
 
 In Jenin, 17% of surveyed households still had no electricity. In Nablus, 
this is the case for 5% of the respondents while elsewhere it amounts at a 
maximum of 2%. 
 
Table 5  Clean water conditions by location 
 
  Hebron Bethlehem Ramallah Nablus Jenin Tulkarem 
& Qalqilia
 
No disruptions 93 129 109 49 62 132 574 
  37.3% 51.2% 41.1% 19.4% 24.8% 52.4% 37.7% 
Disruption for few days 55 99 135 170 104 78 641 
  22.1% 39.3% 50.9% 67.2% 41.6% 31.0% 42.1% 
Still no water 63 23 8 23 77 10 204 
  25.3% 9.1% 3.0% 9.1% 30.8% 4.0% 13.4% 
Comes and goes 22 1 11 7 2 27 70 
  8.8% .4% 4.2% 2.8% .8% 10.7% 4.6% 
We use own private wells 9  1 3 3 4 20 
  3.6%  .4% 1.2% 1.2% 1.6% 1.3% 
Water is very scarce 4   1 2 1 8 
  1.6%   .4% .8% .4% .5% 
We buy water 3  1    4 
  1.2%  .4%    .3% 
 Total 249 252 265 253 250 252 1521 
  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 6  Electricity conditions by location 
 
  Hebron Bethlehem Ramallah Nablus Jenin Tulkarem 
& Qalqilia
Total 
        
No disruptions 90 118 67 54 53 87 469 
  35.9% 46.8% 25.3% 21.3% 21.2% 34.4% 30.8% 
Disruption for few days 73 123 151 177 146 104 774 
  29.1% 48.8% 57.0% 70.0% 58.4% 41.1% 50.8% 
Still no electricity 4 4 3 12 42 5 70 
  1.6% 1.6% 1.1% 4.7% 16.8% 2.0% 4.6% 
Comes and goes 84 7 44 10 6 56 207 
  33.5% 2.8% 16.6% 4.0% 2.4% 22.1% 13.6% 
We have a generator     3 1 4 
      1.2% .4% .3% 
 Total 251 252 265 253 250 253 1524 
  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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PART 2. HOUSEHOLD NEEDS AND 
SHORTAGES 
 
 
When respondents were asked what the most important needs of their 
households were in light of the current situation, about 26% responded that it 
was food, while 17% declared that their most important need was money. 
An amazingly large number of the respondents also pointed to the need for 
psychological support, whether this be for children (10%), for adults (11%) 
or for all (3%). Figure 7, below, provides an overview of the most important 
needs of Palestinians. 
 
 
Figure 7  Most important needs reported 
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Table 7, below, illustrates the most important needs of the households in light 
of the current situation according to the location where the respondents 
reside in the West Bank. In general, food seems to be the most important 
need in all of the listed locations. The food problem in Bethlehem seems to 
be more severe than in other locations under examination. Ramallah and 
Hebron seem to be much less affected in this sense. However, two important 
points are worth noting:  
 
1. In Jenin more than in any other location, respondents declared that 
they were in urgent need of a combination or even all of the listed 
items. This clearly points to the severe conditions in the Jenin area.  
 
2. Employment, which in previously conducted surveys (Bocco, Brunner, 
Rabah, 2001a and 2001b; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Rabah 2001), 
used to top the list of needs and priorities of the respondents, is barely 
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mentioned as an important need in this instance. The same 
consideration applies to the “political need” of ending the occupation. It 
might, therefore, be assumed that the Palestinian population under 
the current circumstances remains primarily pre-occupied with 
the basic needs for survival. Once these are met, it seems highly 
predictable that the priority of employment will once again re-emerge 
in full force. 
 
 
Table 7  Most important need according to location 
 
  Hebron Bethlehem Ramallah Nablus Jenin Tulkarem & 
Qalqilia 
Total 
Food 18.0% 40.8% 14.5% 32.4% 27.2% 21.7% 25.7% (388) 
Water 9.4% 2.4% 4.2% 7.9% 10.0% 3.6% 6.2% (94) 
Sanitation/hygiene 1.6% 2.4% 3.1% 2.0% 1.2%  1.7% (26) 
Electricity 1.2%  1.1% 2.8% 2.8% 1.6% 1.6% (24) 
Health/medication 4.9% 4.8% 8.8% 5.9% 8.0% 7.6% 6.7% (101) 
Shelter 1.2% .4% .4% 1.2% 2.0% .8% 1.0% (15) 
Money 14.3% 26.4% 22.5% 11.5% 9.2% 19.3% 17.2% (260) 
Clothing .4%      .1% (1) 
Child psychological 
support 
10.6% 6.0% 12.2% 11.1% 8.0% 11.6% 9.9% (150) 
Adult psychological 
support 
10.6% 6.4% 17.2% 10.7% 4.8% 18.1% 11.3% (171) 
All of the above 4.1% 2.0% 3.1% .4% 11.2% .4% 3.5% (53) 
Employment .4%    .4% .4% .2% (3) 
Nothing 11.4% 2.4% 4.2% 7.1% 8.4% 1.6% 5.8% (88) 
Psycho. Support to all 3.3% 2.8% 2.3% 2.8% 2.0% 5.6% 3.1% (47) 
Ending occupation 8.2% 1.6% 5.7% 4.0% 1.2% 6.4% 4.5% (68) 
Other needs .4% 1.6% .8% .4% 3.6% 1.2% 1.3% (20) 
 TOTAL 
 
100.0%
(245) 
100.0% 
(250) 
100.0% 
(262) 
100.0%
(253) 
100.0% 
(250) 
100.0% 
(249) 
100.0% 
(1509) 
 
 
Those respondents who stated that food was their households’ most 
important need in the current situation, were asked to indicate what specific 
food item they were most short of. As illustrated in figure 8, below, more than 
60% of the respondents declared that their main shortage consisted of 
basic commodities such as flour, sugar and rice. For another 20% of the 
respondents the most important food need was baby food. 
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Figure 8  Types of food needed 
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When asked, in table 8, about the reasons behind their inability to buy 
essential items for their households, more than 14% of the respondents said 
that they were able to buy essential items. A large number of respondents 
(almost 40%) blamed the curfew for their inability to buy essential items. 
About 18% of the respondents said that there was nothing in the shops and 
as such they could not buy essentials for their household. Another 18% of the 
interviewees explained that they could not buy essential items for their 
households because they do not have money. 
 
 
Table 8  Reasons for not buying essential items for household  
 
  N Valid Percent 
Because of the curfew 589 38.9 
Shops are closed 18 1.2 
Nothing in the shops 274 18.1 
Don’t have money 276 18.2 
Can buy essential items 214 14.1 
Other reasons 6 .4 
Because of closure 26 1.7 
Price increase 12 .8 
Combination of the above 101 6.7 
Total 1516 100.0 
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PART 3. DAMAGES 
 
 
About 73% of the respondents declared that the IDF did not enter their house 
and about 76% said that the IDF did not enter their place of work. Far more 
respondents whose house had been entered by the Israeli army (51%) than 
those whose office had been entered by the Israeli army (18%) stated that 
the soldiers had not caused any damage. Similarly, whereas 28% of the 
respondents said that the army caused some damage to the house, 30% 
stated that the army inflicted some damage to their place of work. Also, 
whereas 12% of the respondents affirmed that the IDF had damaged their 
house a lot, 33% confirmed that their place of work had been damaged a lot. 
Finally, 2% (n=6) had their house totally damaged, and 5% (n=15) had their 
offices totally damaged.  
 
As such, one may conclude from the results presented in figures 9 and , 
below, that overall more and heavier damage seems to have been 
inflicted by the IDF on places of work than of houses17. 
 
 
Figure 9  Reported damage by Israeli soldiers in Palestinian homes 
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entering Palestinian homes
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17 See the introduction of this report for the situation concerning public buildings and 
infrastructure.  
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Figure 10 Reported damage by Israeli soldiers in Palestinian companies 
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It is also worth noting that despite the relatively small number of respondents 
from refugee camps, it is still fair to state that camp residents have suffered 
more damages to their houses than city dwellers. It is also possible to 
deduct from the results in table 9, below, that by the time the survey was 
concluded those respondents residing in cities seem to have suffered a 
higher degree of damage inflicted to their residences than their counterparts 
in villages. 
 
 
Table 9  Level of damages to residences according to area 
  City Village RC Total 
No 779 290 47 1116 
  72.5% 76.7% 66.2% 73.2% 
Left without damages 158 48 3 209 
  14.7% 12.7% 4.2% 13.7% 
Left with some damages 74 29 13 116 
  6.9% 7.7% 18.3% 7.6% 
Left with lots of damages 39 5 5 49 
  3.6% 1.3% 7.0% 3.2% 
Stole some values 6 2 1 9 
  .6% .5% 1.4% .6% 
House totally damaged 4 1 1 6 
  .4% .3% 1.4% .4% 
Lots of damages and property stolen 9 2 1 12 
  .8% .5% 1.4% .8% 
Kicked us out & used house as military post 5 1  6 
  .5% .3%  .4% 
Yes, and took son as human shield 1   1 
  .1%   .1% 
 TOTAL 1075 378 71 1524 
  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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According to BADIL (2002e), “during the first three months of 2002, Israeli 
military forces demolished more than 200 refugee shelters in the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank (…). The occupancy rate of the refugee shelters that 
were demolished or otherwise rendered unusable or requiring repairs was 
90%. In March the IDF destroyed 141 refugee shelters in the West Bank 
refugee camps and damaged 1,800 other shelters.  
 
The total damage to refugee shelters during the first three months of 2002 is 
equal to more than half of the entire damage resulting from Israeli military 
assaults since the beginning of the Palestinian uprising”.  
 
At the end of March 2002, UNRWA estimated that IDF’s “Colorful Journey 
Operation” will amount to at least US$ 3.8 million in immediate costs. Repair 
and reconstruction of damaged and destroyed refugee shelters alone, is 
estimated to cost US$ 2.8 million. This sum amounts to nearly half of the total 
emergency budget requested by UNRWA for repair and rehabilitation of 
refugee shelters for all of 2002 and exceeds the budget for the West Bank by 
four times.  
 
During 2002, the UN Agency intended to focus greater attention on the 
repairs on refugee shelters in the poorer areas of the Southern Gaza Strip 
and the hardest hit village areas where refugees reside in the West Bank. A 
significant proportion of the Agency’s emergency fund for shelter repair will 
have now to be redirected to the camps.  
 
Respondents were also asked whether or not they saw houses or shops in 
their neighbourhood being damaged or looted by the Israeli army. Nearly 
60% of the interviewees did not witness any looting or damaging. As 
indicated in table 10, below, 16% witnessed neighbouring houses being 
damaged and 7% saw neighbouring houses being looted by the Israeli 
military. About 3% declared to have seen neighbouring shops that were 
damaged by the Israeli troops, and 2% witnessed the looting of such shops.  
 
Some respondents went on to specify what they witnessed exactly. A number 
of persons interviewed caught sight of houses and shops being looted or 
destroyed with people inside; others declared that they noticed the 
vandalizing and looting of banks, companies, offices, schools, public places, 
agricultural property, and even the chamber of commerce; still others 
witnessed the destruction of cars. 
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Table 10  Witnessing of looting or damage by soldiers in uninhabited 
property in the neighborhood 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
House/s was damaged 247 16.3 
House/s was looted 105 6.9 
Shop/s was damaged 46 3.0 
Shop/s was looted 34 2.2 
House is looted with residents inside 3 .2 
Shop was destroyed with owner inside 1 .1 
Vandalizing banks and chambers of commerce 3 .2 
Vandalizing and looting companies and offices 10 .7 
Vandalizing schools and public places 18 1.2 
Vandalizing agricultural property 4 .3 
Destroying cars 12 .8 
Other 3 .2 
Combination of the above 129 8.5 
Did not witness anything 901 59.4 
Total 1516 100.0 
 
 
Interviewees were also queried about an even more personal type of damage 
or suffering, namely whether or not any of their household members were 
injured or killed (see table 11). A large majority, 94% responded that none of 
their household members were injured or killed. Still, 5% of the respondents 
(n=70) reported about injured household members, while 1% (n=22) informed 
the interviewers about killed relatives. 
 
 
Table 11 Household members injured or killed 
  Frequency Valid Percent 
No 1428 93.8 
Injured 70 4.6 
Killed 22 1.4 
Some killed, some injured 2 .1 
Total 1522 100.0 
* 15 of the reported killed were from the north of the West Bank 
 
 
 
As illustrated in figure 11, below, 12% of the interviewees stated that 
members of their household had been arrested. Of those, 43% declared that 
the detention lasted for a few days, while 19% said that the arrest only lasted 
for a few hours. More than 18% still have household members in detention 
and have had news, while 18% said that household members are still 
detained in an unknown place. 
 
 
 
 29
Figure 11 Arrested household members 
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PART 4. ACCESS TO HEALTH 
 
 
Health delivery was one of the most severely disrupted services during the 
Israeli re-occupation. The long curfew has prevented health professionals 
from reaching their hospitals and clinics, ambulances were often prevented 
from moving freely, and the inability of Palestinians to leave their homes 
made it very difficult for them to seek medical assistance. This has been a 
considerable source of concern especially with respect to childbirth, chronic 
disease management and emergency medical needs – surgery in particular, 
where hospitalization and/or specialty care is needed. On the 8th and the 9th 
April, Mustafa Barghouti (2002) and Miftah (2002) respectively released short 
reports and gave press conferences who highlighted different forms of 
impediments of medical treatment for the sick and the wounded, pointed 
to attacks on medical personnel and the destruction of medical 
infrastructure and utilities, and stressed as well the fact that the evacuation 
of casualties in most instances was not guaranteed. This view was 
substantiated by various press reports, by local organizations (Giacaman 
2002) and international agencies (HART 2002 and OCHA 2002) through 
reports made available in the second half of April.  
 
According to the respondents of our survey, a significant number of them 
stated that they were unable to seek medical services such as 
medication, hospitalization, and other types of medical assistance. As 
indicated in figure 12, below, almost half of the respondents said that one or 
more members of their household required some kind of medical care. Of 
those, 53% were in need of medication, 16% needed an ambulance or 
hospitalization, while almost 20% were in need of a doctor’s visit. Household 
members were also in need of vaccinations, care of pregnant women who 
had to deliver their babies or post-natal care for the new-born babies. 
 
 
Figure 12  Need for medical care 
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The curfew on cities had also a negative impact on villages that were not 
even under curfew. As indicated below in table 12, over 26% of villagers 
needed to see a doctor, but were most probably unable to do so because 
cities were under curfew and, as such, could not be reached. Cities, on the 
other hand, were more pressed for medication because pharmacies 
remained closed under the strict curfew that was maintained in most of the 
cities. 
 
 
 Table 12  Household's needs for medical care according to area 
  City Village RC Total 
Medication 293 74 18 385 
  58.5% 41.1% 42.9% 53.3% 
Hospitalization/ambulance 79 31 6 116 
  15.8% 17.2% 14.3% 16.0% 
Visit to a doctor 77 47 15 139 
  15.4% 26.1% 35.7% 19.2% 
Delivery 8 10 1 19 
  1.6% 5.6% 2.4% 2.6% 
Vaccination 10 5 1 16 
  2.0% 2.8% 2.4% 2.2% 
Care of pregnant women 5 5  10 
  1.0% 2.8%  1.4% 
Psychological assistance 5 1  6 
  1.0% .6%  .8% 
Unspecified need 8 1  9 
  1.6% .6%  1.2% 
Combination of the above 16 6 1 23 
  3.2% 3.3% 2.4% 3.2% 
Total  501 180 42 723 
  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
When respondents who were in need of an ambulance and hospitalisation 
were asked whether or not they were able to receive such services, only 17 
respondents (5%) said that an ambulance arrived in one hour or less, and 
11% said that an ambulance arrived after few hours. As indicated in table 9, 
below, in 28% of the cases the ambulance did not arrive at all, while 47% of 
the respondents were unable to call an ambulance. A closer look at table 13 
according to the location the respondents reside in, also indicates that 
compared to elsewhere in many more cases in the northern part of the West 
Bank the ambulances did not arrive at all. 
 
 
 32
 Table 13  Ambulance arrival 
  Hebron Bethlehem Ramallah Nablus Jenin Tulkarem 
& Qalqilia
Total 
Arrived in one hour or less 4 1 1 2 4 5 17 
  8.3% 2.4% 2.1% 5.0% 4.7% 8.6% 5.3% 
Arrived after few hours 1 2 13 4 4 10 34 
  2.1% 4.9% 27.1% 10.0% 4.7% 17.2% 10.6% 
Arrived after 24 hours  2 4 5  3 14 
   4.9% 8.3% 12.5%  5.2% 4.4% 
Didn’t arrive at all 3 10 4 16 26 31 90 
  6.3% 24.4% 8.3% 40.0% 30.2% 53.4% 28.0% 
Used our own transportation 11 1  1 1  14 
  22.9% 2.4%  2.5% 1.2%  4.4% 
We couldn't call an 
ambulance 
29 25 26 12 51 9 152 
  60.4% 61.0% 54.2% 30.0% 59.3% 15.5% 47.4% 
 Total 48 41 48 40 86 58 321 
  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
When asked as to how those households who were in need of medical 
attention and were unable to receive it, dealt with the situation, respondents 
cited, in table 14, various utilised alternatives to acquire medical care. More 
than 40% waited for help and only received medical service after the curfew 
was lifted, while 20% received treatment but not by a specialist. About 16% 
received help from a doctor or health worker in the neighbourhood, 5% were 
treated by phone, while 6% found medication by other means. Out of lack of 
proper medication, 6% used herbal medication. In some cases waiting for 
help until after the curfew was lifted proved to be fatal. Indeed, one 
respondent said that a household member died while waiting for an 
ambulance. Others did not wait for help and carried the patient to hospital at 
their own risk (3%). One respondent explained that a woman in the 
household delivered a baby at the checkpoint.  
 
 
 Table 14 Alternatives used for dealing with the illness/emergency 
  Frequency Valid Percent 
Treating by phone 27 5.2 
Doctor/health worker in the neighborhood 82 15.9 
Wait for help 208 40.4 
No treatment was provided by a specialist 104 20.2 
The Fire department 2 .4 
We took a risk to go to hospital 17 3.3 
We stocked on medication 11 2.1 
We used herbal medication and what is available instead 29 5.6 
We found medication by other means 33 6.4 
Delivery took place at checkpoint 1 .1 
Patient died while waiting for ambulance 1 .2 
Total 515 100.0 
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Furthermore, according to UNRWA (2002a), the Defensive Shields Operation 
“crippled hospitals with food, medicines, water, oxygen, disposable supplies 
and fuel all in short supply. In hospitals in Jenin and Ramallah, corpses 
decayed in the morgues, because there was no electricity and the hospitals 
could not turn the bodies of the dead over to their families for proper burial. 
The risk of epidemic disease grew daily, owing to a lack of water and 
sanitation, the contamination of drinking water with sewage and, in places the 
bodies of the dead left in open.  
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PART 5. IMPACT ON CHILDREN 
 
 
Children also did not escape the negative effects of the latest Israeli military 
operation in large parts of the West Bank. As already indicated above in 
section 2 of this report, 10% of the respondents affirmed that psychological 
support for their children is the most important need of their household. 
Almost 640’000 Palestinians under the age of 18 have been (and partially still 
are) subjected to military incursions and curfew. The unprecedented level of 
violence has increased the trend already manifested since the beginning of 
the second Intifada for child psychological support (Bocco, Brunner, Rabah 
2001a, and 2001b; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Rabah 2001). 
 
As shown in table 15, when respondents were asked what affected the 
children in their household the most, 39% said that it was the shooting and 
another 21% responded that the witnessing of military operations affected 
their children most. About 11% reported the violence on TV that had a major 
effect on the children. Moreover, eleven respondents said that the arrest and 
beating of relatives affected the children in the household most. Another 
three respondents referred to the injury and death of relatives as the most 
important impact on their children. More than 22% of the respondents stated 
that the children in their household were badly affected by a combination of 
all these reasons. 
 
 
 Table 15  Most important impact on children 
  Hebron Bethlehem Ramallah Nablus Jenin Tulkarem 
& Qalqilia
Total 
Shooting 96 90 69 135 83 101 574 
  39.2% 36.7% 26.3% 54.0% 33.6% 41.7% 38.5% 
Violence on TV 48 30 25 15 23 19 160 
  19.6% 12.2% 9.5% 6.0% 9.3% 7.9% 10.7% 
Confinement at home 6 25 19 9 19 8 86 
  2.4% 10.2% 7.3% 3.6% 7.7% 3.3% 5.8% 
Witnessing military operations 57 47 64 21 65 54 308 
  23.3% 19.2% 24.4% 8.4% 26.3% 22.3% 20.7% 
Arrest, round up, beating  3 3 1 1 3 11 
   1.2% 1.1% .4% .4% 1.2% .7% 
Injury& death of relatives   2  1  3 
    .8%  .4%  .2% 
Other 4 5 3 1 3 3 19 
  1.6% 2.0% 1.1% .4% 1.2% 1.2% 1.3% 
Combination of the above 34 45 77 68 52 54 330 
  13.9% 18.4% 29.4% 27.2% 21.1% 22.3% 22.1% 
 Total 245 245 262 250 247 242 1491 
  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
 
 
As the special representative for UNICEF has stressed, “more than 2500 
children and women have been displaced from the Jenin refugee camp since 
April 9th (…). In addition, the shock of loosing a family member to martyrdom 
or injury, the humiliation, the fear and the disturbance result in great harm, 
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decreasing children’s trust in adults and possibly making them believe that 
violence is the way to solve problems” (Abu Halaweh 2002). Actually, 
sleeping disorders and several forms of fear seem to be the more 
widespread manifestations of psychological difficulties of children to 
cope with the situation. Furthermore, some children tend to become 
isolated or aggressive, and many are exhibiting attention disorders, which will 
directly affect their schooling.  
 
Although the need for children psychological support is very important, it is a 
need connected to many others, including health and education. Actually, 
because of the curfew, women and children have been (and in many cases 
still are) unable to reach health centers to receive natal care and 
immunizations. The children health status has been rapidly deteriorating, 
especially for families who are not receiving proper diets as a result of 
poverty and the siege. Malnutrition and the lack of healthcare could also 
rapidly lead to the spread of diseases.  
 
Concerning education, in particular for refugee children, UNRWA’s schools 
closed at the start of the IDF offensive. Initial attempts to reopen schools in 
location where there was calm were not entirely successful, either because 
teachers were unable to reach their classrooms, or parents were fearful of 
sending their children to school. As of 23rd of April, most of UNRWA’s schools 
were back to session, with the notable exception of those in and around 
Bethlehem, in the village of Jiftlik and the Jenin refugee camp.  
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ANNEX I - ENGLISH QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
I am from the JMCC and we are conducting a survey to assess the needs of the 
Palestinian people, which are a result of the Israeli reoccupation in the Palestinian 
towns, cities, and refugee camps. Your number is randomly selected and we use the 
information only for the above-mentioned purpose. 
 
 
Telephone number__________ 
Time of interview: Hour___________       Day_______ 
 
 
1 If any, what kind of medical care did any of your 
household members need during the Israeli incursion? 
1. Medication. 
2. Hospitalisation/ambulance 
3. No, we did not need medical care 
(GO TO Q. 5) 
 
2  If hospitalisation/ambulance, did the ambulance?  1. Arrived immediately 
2. Arrived after few hours 
3. Arrived after more than 24 hours 
4. Ambulance never arrived 
5. We used our own means of 
transportation 
6. We did not call for an ambulance 
7. Other __________ 
8. Not applicable 
9. No answer 
 
3 If ambulance was needed but was late, in your opinion, 
what was the reason for the delay? 
1. The ambulance was prevented 
from moving. 
2. The ambulances had a lot of work 
3. There were no ambulances in the 
area where we live  
4. We could not call an ambulance 
5. Other _______________ 
6. Not applicable 
 
4 What other alternatives were available to you or your 
household for treating the ill member of the house? 
1. Treating by telephone 
2. Neighbourhood doctor 
3. We had to wait for help 
4. No treatment was provided by a 
specialist  
5. We were able to have medical help 
only after curfew was lifted 
6. Not applicable 
7. DK/NA 
 
5 Did any of the Israeli soldiers enter into your house? If 
yes, where they involved in 
1. No, they did not search our house 
2. Yes and left without damages 
3. Yes and left with some damage 
4. Yes and left with a lot of damages 
to the house 
5. Yes and stole some values 
6. House totally damaged 
7. Other (specify)________ 
8. DK/NA 
 
5 Have any of your household members (from among 
those living in the same house) been injured or killed? 
1. No  
2. Yes (injured)  
3. Yes (killed) 
4. Other (specify)_____________ 
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6 Have any of your household members (from among 
those living in the same house) been arrested? 
1. No  
2. Yes, for a few hours and are back 
3. Yes, for a few days and are back 
4. Yes, still in detention and we have 
had news / contacts 
5. Yes, still in detention in an 
unknown place 
6. DK/NA 
 
7 How do you describe your household’s current living 
conditions in comparison to before the reoccupation? 
1. Same 
2. Manageable 
3. Difficult 
4. Destitue 
 
8 In light of the current situation, from the following, 
what in your opinion are the two most important needs 
of your households NOW? 
 
1. Food 
2. Water 
3. Sanitation/hygiene 
4. Electricity 
5. Health/medication 
6. Shelter 
7. Money 
8. Clothing 
9. Child psychological support 
10. Adult psychosocial support 
 
1st priority_______ 
2nd priority_______ 
 
 
 
9 If food is one of your priorities, what is the most 
needed food item? 
1. Baby food 
2. Basic commodities such as flour, 
sugar, tea, rice… 
3. Dairy products 
4. Canned food 
5. fresh foods such as vvegetables and 
fruits 
6. Meat/poultry 
 
10 What do you think affected the children in your 
household most? (ONLY THE MOST IMPORTANT) 
1. Shooting 
2. Violence on TV 
3. Confinement at home, 
4. Witnessing military operations 
5.  Arrest, round up and beating of 
relatives 
 
10 When the conflict is over, what do you think your 
children will need most? 
(ONLY THE MOST IMPORTANT) 
1. Go back to school 
2. Play with friends 
3. Get psychosocial support 
4.  Access medical services 
5.  Eat as before 
6. Stop watching TV 
7.  Do sports.... 
 
11 For how long can you cope with the money you 
currently have? 
1. For a long time 
2. Only for few weeks 
3. Only for a few days 
4. We already ran out of money 
 
12 What are the conditions like with clean water? 1. We did not have any disruptions to 
the water supply 
2. We had disruptions in the water 
supply for _____days. 
3. We still do not have any water  
 
13 What are the conditions like with electricity? 1. We did not have any cuts in 
electricity 
2. We had cuts in electricity supply 
for _____days. 
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3. We still do not have electricity  
14 If you cannot buy essential items for your household, is 
it because: 
1. Cannot buy because of curfew 
2. Cannot buy even during curfew 
because shops are closed 
3. There is nothing in shops because of 
their inability to re-supply 
4. I do not have money to buy 
5. Other _____ 
6. I can buy essential items 
7. DK/NA 
 
15 Since when has the curfew been in place in the area 
where you live? 
 
_________________ days. 
 
16 Do you personally know of families who have taken in 
other people because of the situation? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
17 Did you witness any types of looting or damages by the 
soldiers to property that is uninhabited or unattended in 
your immediate neighborhood? 
3. An uninhabited house(s) was 
damaged 
4. An uninhabited house(s) was looted 
5. A shop(s) was damaged 
6. A shop(s) was looted  
7. Other (specify)_________ 
 
18 Gender 8. Male 
9. Female 
 
19 Residence 1. City (name of city)_____________ 
2. Village (name of  village)________ 
3. RC (name of camp)_____________ 
 
 
20 Area 1. Hebron area 
2. Bethlehem area 
3. Ramallah area 
4. Nablus area 
5. Jenin area 
6. Tulkarem and Qalqilia 
15 
21 Age of respondents _______years  
22  Number of people in the household including children _______persons  
 PLEASE ADD ANY OTHER PERTINANT 
INFORMATION PPROVIDED BY THE 
RESPONDENT (eg. Witnessing killing by soldiers, 
stopping ambulances, using Palestinians as human 
shields) 
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ANNEX II - FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS 
 
C1N1 Household needs medical care  
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 No 800 52.5 52.5 52.5 
1 Yes 723 47.4 47.5 100.0 Valid 
Total 1523 99.9 100.0  
Missing System 1 .1   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
 
C1N2 Household's needs for medical care  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
1 medication 385 25.3 53.3 53.3 
2 hospitalisation/ambulance 116 7.6 16.0 69.3 
3 visit to a doctor 139 9.1 19.2 88.5 
4 delivery 19 1.2 2.6 91.1 
5 vaccination 16 1.0 2.2 93.4 
6 care of pregnant women 10 .7 1.4 94.7 
7 psychological assistance 6 .4 .8 95.6 
8 unspecified need 9 .6 1.2 96.8 
10 combination of the above 23 1.5 3.2 100.0 
Valid 
Total 723 47.4 100.0  
0 no medical needs 800 52.5   
System 1 .1   Missing 
Total 801 52.6   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
C2 Ambulance arrival  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
1 arrived in one hour or less 17 1.1 5.3 5.3 
2 arrived after few hours 34 2.2 10.6 15.9 
3 arrived after 24 hours 14 .9 4.4 20.2 
4 didn't arrive at all 90 5.9 28.0 48.3 
5 used our own transportation 14 .9 4.4 52.6 
6 we couldn't call an ambulance 152 10.0 47.4 100.0 
Valid 
Total 321 21.1 100.0  
98 not applicable 1202 78.9   
99 no answer 1 .1   Missing 
Total 1203 78.9   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
C3N Alternatives used for dealing with the ill  
 
 Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 treating by phone 27 1.8 5.2 5.2 
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2 doctor/health worker in the neighborhood 82 5.4 15.9 21.2 
3 wait for help 208 13.6 40.4 61.6 
4 no treatment was provided by a specialist 105 6.9 20.4 81.9 
7 Patient carried to hospital by hands with 
risk 5 .3 1.0 82.9 
8 The Fire department 2 .1 .4 83.3 
10 We took a risk to go to hospital 12 .8 2.3 85.6 
11 We stocked on medication 11 .7 2.1 87.8 
12 We used herbal medication and what is 
available instead 29 1.9 5.6 93.4 
13 we found medication by other means 33 2.2 6.4 99.8 
16 Patinet died while waiting for ambulance 1 .1 .2 100.0 
 
Total 515 33.8 100.0  
Missing System 1009 66.2   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
C4A IDF soldiers entered house  
 
 Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 no 1116 73.2 73.2 73.2 
2 left without damages 209 13.7 13.7 86.9 
3 left with some damages 116 7.6 7.6 94.6 
4 left with lots of damages 49 3.2 3.2 97.8 
5 stole some values 9 .6 .6 98.4 
6 house totally damaged 6 .4 .4 98.8 
8 lots of damages and property stolen 12 .8 .8 99.5 
10 kicked us out & used house as military 
post 6 .4 .4 99.9 
11 yes, and took son as human shield 1 .1 .1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 1524 100.0 100.0  
 
C4B IDF soldiers entered office  
 
 Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 no 893 58.6 76.3 76.3 
2 left without damages 50 3.3 4.3 80.6 
3 left with some damages 82 5.4 7.0 87.6 
4 left with lots of damages 92 6.0 7.9 95.5 
5 stole some values 19 1.2 1.6 97.1 
6 office totally damaged 16 1.0 1.4 98.5 
11 lots of damages and property stolen 15 1.0 1.3 99.7 
13 Entered shop, but we do not know the 
damages 1 .1 .1 99.8 
15 Shelled my place of work 1 .1 .1 99.9 
18 yes, and they stayed in it 1 .1 .1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 1170 76.8 100.0  
8 I do not work 242 15.9   
17 I work in Israel 6 .4   
Missing 
88 don't know 106 7.0   
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 Total 354 23.2   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
C5 Household members injured or killed  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
1 no 1428 93.7 93.8 93.8 
2 injured 70 4.6 4.6 98.4 
3 killed 22 1.4 1.4 99.9 
5 some killed, some injured 2 .1 .1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 1522 99.9 100.0  
6 I live alone in the house 1 .1   
88 don't know 1 .1   Missing 
Total 2 .1   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
C6N1 Household members arrested  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 No 1340 87.9 88.2 88.2 
1 Yes 180 11.8 11.8 100.0 Valid 
Total 1520 99.7 100.0  
Missing System 4 .3   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
C6N2 Treatment of arrested household members  
 
 Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
2 for few hours 34 2.2 18.9 18.9 
3 for few days 77 5.1 42.8 61.7 
4 still in detention and we have had 
news 33 2.2 18.3 80.0 
5 detention in an unknown place 32 2.1 17.8 97.8 
7 used as human shield 4 .3 2.2 100.0 
Valid 
Total 180 11.8 100.0  
Missing System 1344 88.2   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
C7 Living conditions compared to before the reoccupation  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
1 same 47 3.1 3.1 3.1 
2 worse but manageable 154 10.1 10.1 13.2 
3 worse - difficult 472 31.0 31.1 44.3 
4 worse - destitute 846 55.5 55.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 1519 99.7 100.0  
88 don't know 2 .1   
99 no answer 3 .2   Missing
Total 5 .3   
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Total 1524 100.0   
 
C8N Most important need  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
1 food 388 25.5 25.7 25.7 
2 water 94 6.2 6.2 31.9 
3 sanitation/hygiene 26 1.7 1.7 33.7 
4 electricity 24 1.6 1.6 35.3 
5 health/medication 101 6.6 6.7 41.9 
6 shelter 15 1.0 1.0 42.9 
7 money 260 17.1 17.2 60.2 
8 clothing 1 .1 .1 60.2 
9 child psychological support 151 9.9 10.0 70.2 
10 adult psychological support 228 15.0 15.1 85.4 
11 combination of the above 8 .5 .5 85.9 
12 All of the above 53 3.5 3.5 89.4 
13 employment 3 .2 .2 89.6 
14 nothing 88 5.8 5.8 95.4 
18 Ending occupation 68 4.5 4.5 99.9 
20 To release father from prison 1 .1 .1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 1509 99.0 100.0  
88 don't know 2 .1   
99 no answer 13 .9   Missing 
Total 15 1.0   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
C9N Nature of food needed  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
1.00 baby food 108 7.1 19.6 19.6 
2.00 basic commodities such as flour 339 22.2 61.6 81.3 
3.00 dairy products 26 1.7 4.7 86.0 
4.00 canned food 4 .3 .7 86.7 
5.00 vegetables and fruits 23 1.5 4.2 90.9 
6.00 meat/poultry 1 .1 .2 91.1 
8.00 combination of the above 46 3.0 8.4 99.5 
10.00 all of the above 3 .2 .5 100.0 
Valid 
Total 550 36.1 100.0  
Missing System 974 63.9   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
C10N Most important affect for children  
 
 Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 shooting 574 37.7 38.5 38.5 
2 violence on TV 160 10.5 10.7 49.2 
Valid 
3 confinement at home 86 5.6 5.8 55.0 
 48
4 witnessing military operations 308 20.2 20.7 75.7 
5 arrest, round up and beating of 
relatives 11 .7 .7 76.4 
6 injury and death of relatives 3 .2 .2 76.6 
7 other 19 1.2 1.3 77.9 
8 combination of the above 330 21.7 22.1 100.0 
 
Total 1491 97.8 100.0  
Missing System 33 2.2   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
C11 Duration of coping with money  
 
 Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 for a long time 128 8.4 8.9 8.9 
2 only for few weeks 447 29.3 31.1 40.0 
3 only for few days 471 30.9 32.8 72.8 
4 ran out of money 371 24.3 25.8 98.6 
5 no use for money while we are under 
curfew 17 1.1 1.2 99.8 
6 No need for money because we can't go 
and buy anything 2 .1 .1 99.9 
7 Forced to manage with or without money 1 .1 .1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 1437 94.3 100.0  
88 don't know 77 5.1   
99 no answer 10 .7   Missing 
Total 87 5.7   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
C12 Clean water conditions  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
1 no disruptions 574 37.7 37.7 37.7 
2 disruption for few days 641 42.1 42.1 79.9 
3 still no water 204 13.4 13.4 93.3 
5 comes and goes 70 4.6 4.6 97.9 
7 we use own private wells 20 1.3 1.3 99.2 
8 water is very scarce 8 .5 .5 99.7 
10 we buy water 4 .3 .3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 1521 99.8 100.0  
Missing 88 don't know 3 .2   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
C13 Electricity conditions  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 no disruptions 469 30.8 30.8 30.8 
2 disruption for few days 774 50.8 50.8 81.6 
3 still no electricity 70 4.6 4.6 86.2 
Valid 
5 comes and goes 207 13.6 13.6 99.7 
 49
6 we have a generator 4 .3 .3 100.0  
Total 1524 100.0 100.0  
 
C14N Reasons for not buying essential items for household  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
1 because of the curfew 589 38.6 38.9 38.9 
2 shops are closed 18 1.2 1.2 40.0 
3 nothing in the shops 274 18.0 18.1 58.1 
5 don't have money 276 18.1 18.2 76.3 
6 can buy essential items 214 14.0 14.1 90.4 
7 other reasons 6 .4 .4 90.8 
8 because of closure 26 1.7 1.7 92.5 
9 price increase 12 .8 .8 93.3 
10 combination of the above 101 6.6 6.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 1516 99.5 100.0  
Missing System 8 .5   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
C15 Personal knowledge of families who took in other people  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 yes 833 54.7 55.1 55.1 
2 no 680 44.6 44.9 100.0 Valid 
Total 1513 99.3 100.0  
88 don't know 9 .6   
99 no answer 2 .1   Missing 
Total 11 .7   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
C16N Witnessing of looting or damage by soldiers in unhabited houses of the neighb  
 
 Frequency Percent
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 house/s was damaged 247 16.2 16.3 16.3 
2 house/s was looted 105 6.9 6.9 23.2 
3 shop/s was damaged 46 3.0 3.0 26.3 
4 shop/s was looted 34 2.2 2.2 28.5 
8 house is looted with residents inside 3 .2 .2 28.7 
12 shop was destroyed with owner inside 1 .1 .1 28.8 
20 vandalizng banks + chamber of 
commerce 3 .2 .2 29.0 
21 vandalizing and looting companies and 
offices 10 .7 .7 29.6 
22 vandalizing schools and public places 18 1.2 1.2 30.8 
23 vandalizing agricultural property 4 .3 .3 31.1 
24 destroying cars 12 .8 .8 31.9 
50 other 3 .2 .2 32.1 
60 combination of the above 129 8.5 8.5 40.6 
Valid 
80 did not witness anything 901 59.1 59.4 100.0 
 50
 Total 1516 99.5 100.0  
Missing System 8 .5   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
C17A Area  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 city 1075 70.5 70.5 70.5 
2 village 378 24.8 24.8 95.3 
3 RC 71 4.7 4.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 1524 100.0 100.0  
 
C18 Location  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 Hebron 251 16.5 16.5 16.5 
2 Bethlehem 252 16.5 16.5 33.0 
3 Ramallah 265 17.4 17.4 50.4 
4 Nablus 253 16.6 16.6 67.0 
5 Jenin 250 16.4 16.4 83.4 
6 Tulkarem & Qalqilia 253 16.6 16.6 100.0 
Valid
Total 1524 100.0 100.0  
 
C20 Gender  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 male 882 57.9 58.0 58.0 
2 female 639 41.9 42.0 100.0 Valid 
Total 1521 99.8 100.0  
9 1 .1   
99 no answer 2 .1   Missing 
Total 3 .2   
Total 1524 100.0   
 
 
 
